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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-1671
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WILLIAM J. MERTENS, ALEX W. BANDROWSKI,
JAMES A. CLARK, and RUSSELL FRANZ,
PETITIONERS v. HEWITT ASSOCIATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the ninth circuit
[June 1, 1993]

  Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The question presented is whether a nonfiduciary who
knowingly participates in the breach of a fiduciary duty
imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 832, as amended, 29 U. S. C.
1001 et seq., is liable for losses that an employee benefit
plan suffers as a result of the breach.

                     I
  According to the complaint, the allegations of which we
take as true, petitioners represent a class of former
employees of the Kaiser Steel Corporation (Kaiser) who
participated in the Kaiser Steel Retirement Plan, a
qualified pension plan under ERISA.  Respondent was the
plan's actuary in 1980, when Kaiser began to phase out
its steelmaking operations, prompting early retirement by
a large number of plan participants.  Respondent did not,
however, change the plan's actuarial assumptions to reflect
the additional costs imposed by the retirements.  As a
result, Kaiser did not adequately fund the plan, and
eventually the plan's assets became insufficient to satisfy
its benefit obligations, causing the Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corporation (PBGC) to terminate the plan pursuant

to 29 U. S. C. 1341.  Petitioners now receive only the
benefits guaranteed by ERISA, see 1322, which are in
general substantially lower than the fully vested pensions
due them under the plan.
  Petitioners sued the fiduciaries of the failed plan,
alleging breach of fiduciary duties.  See Mertens v. Black,
948 F. 2d 1105 (CA9 1991) (per curiam) (affirming denial
of summary judgment).  They also commenced this action
against respondent, alleging that it had caused the losses
by allowing Kaiser to select the plan's actuarial assump-
tions, by failing to disclose that Kaiser was one of its
clients, and by failing to disclose the plan's funding
shortfall.  Petitioners claimed that these acts and omis-
sions violated ERISA by effecting a breach of respondent's
-professional duties- to the plan, for which they sought,
inter alia, monetary relief.  In opposing respondent's
motion to dismiss, petitioners fleshed out this claim,
asserting that respondent was liable (1) as an ERISA
fiduciary that committed a breach of its own fiduciary
duties, (2) as a nonfiduciary that knowingly participated
in the plan fiduciaries' breach of their fiduciary duties,
and (3) as a nonfiduciary that committed a breach of
nonfiduciary duties imposed on actuaries by ERISA.  The
District Court for the Northern District of California
dismissed the complaint, App. to Pet. for Cert. A17, and
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in
relevant part, 948 F. 2d 607 (1991).
  Petitioners sought certiorari only on the question
whether ERISA authorizes suits for money damages
against nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate in a
fiduciary's breach of fiduciary duty.  We agreed to hear
the case.  506 U. S. ___ (1992).

                    II
  ERISA is, we have observed, a -comprehensive and
reticulated statute,- the product of a decade of congres-
sional study of the Nation's private employee benefit
system.  Nachman Corp. v. PBGC, 446 U. S. 359, 361
(1980).  The statute provides that not only the persons
named as fiduciaries by a benefit plan, see 29 U. S. C.
1102(a), but also anyone else who exercises discretionary
control or authority over the plan's management, adminis-
tration, or assets, see 1002(21)(A), is an ERISA -fiduc-
iary.-  Fiduciaries are assigned a number of detailed
duties and responsibilities, which include -the proper
management, administration, and investment of [plan]
assets, the maintenance of proper records, the disclosure
of specified information, and the avoidance of conflicts of
interest.-  Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U. S. 134, 142-143 (1985); see 29 U. S. C. 1104(a).
Section 409(a), 29 U. S. C. 1109(a), makes fiduciaries
liable for breach of these duties, and specifies the reme-
dies available against them: the fiduciary is personally
liable for damages (-to make good to [the] plan any losses
to the plan resulting from each such breach-), for restitu-
tion (-to restore to [the] plan any profits of such fiduciary
which have been made through use of assets of the plan
by the fiduciary-), and for -such other equitable or remed-
ial relief as the court may deem appropriate,- including
removal of the fiduciary.  Section 502(a)(2), 29 U. S. C.
1132(a)(2)-the second of ERISA's -six carefully inte-
grated civil enforcement provisions,- Russell, supra, at
146-allows the Secretary of Labor or any plan benefici-
ary, participant, or fiduciary to bring a civil action -for
appropriate relief under section [409].-
  The above described provisions are, however, limited by
their terms to fiduciaries.  The Court of Appeals decided
that respondent was not a fiduciary, see 948 F. 2d, at
610, and petitioners do not contest that holding.  Lacking
equivalent provisions specifying nonfiduciaries as potential
defendants, or damages as a remedy available against
them, petitioners have turned to 502(a)(3), 29 U. S. C.
1132(a)(3), which authorizes a plan beneficiary, partici-
pant, or fiduciary to bring a civil action:
-(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of [ERISA] or the terms of the plan, or (B)
to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions
of [ERISA] or the terms of the plan . . . .-
See also 502(a)(5), 29 U. S. C. 1132(a)(5) (providing, in
similar language, for civil suits by the Secretary based
upon violation of ERISA provisions).  Petitioners contend
that requiring respondent to make the Kaiser plan whole
for the losses resulting from its alleged knowing participa-
tion in the breach of fiduciary duty by the Kaiser plan's
fiduciaries would constitute -other appropriate equitable
relief- within the meaning of 502(a)(3).
  We note at the outset that it is far from clear that,
even if this provision does make money damages available,
it makes them available for the actions at issue here.  It
does not, after all, authorize -appropriate equitable relief-
at large, but only -appropriate equitable relief- for the
purpose of -redress[ing any] violations or . . . enforc[ing]
any provisions- of ERISA or an ERISA plan.  No one
suggests that any term of the Kaiser plan has been
violated, nor would any be enforced by the requested
judgment.  And while ERISA contains various provisions
that can be read as imposing obligations upon nonfiduciar-
ies, including actuaries, no provision explicitly requires
them to avoid participation (knowing or unknowing) in a
fiduciary's breach of fiduciary duty.  It is unlikely, more-
over, that this was an oversight, since ERISA does explic-
itly impose -knowing participation- liability on cofiduciar-
ies.  See 405(a), 29 U. S. C. 1105(a).  That limitation
appears all the more deliberate in light of the fact that
-knowing participation- liability on the part of both
cotrustees and third persons was well established under
the common law of trusts.  See 3 A. Scott & W. Fratcher,
Law of Trusts 224.1, p. 404 (4th ed. 1988) (hereinafter
Scott & Fratcher) (cotrustees); 4 Scott & Fratcher 326,
p. 291 (third persons).  In Russell we emphasized our
unwillingness to infer causes of action in the ERISA
context, since that statute's carefully crafted and detailed
enforcement scheme provides -strong evidence that Con-
gress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it
simply forgot to incorporate expressly.-  473 U. S., at
146-147.  All of this notwithstanding, petitioners and
their amicus the United States seem to assume that
respondent's alleged action (or inaction) violated ERISA,
and address their arguments almost exclusively to what
forms of relief are available.  And respondent, despite
considerable prompting by its amici, expressly disclaims
reliance on this preliminary point.  See Brief for Respond-
ent 18, n. 15; Tr. of Oral Arg. 46.  Thus, although we
acknowledge the oddity of resolving a dispute over reme-
dies where it is unclear that a remediable wrong has been
alleged, we decide this case on the narrow battlefield the
parties have chosen, and reserve decision of that anteced-
ent question.
  Petitioners maintain that the object of their suit is
-appropriate equitable relief- under 502(a)(3).  They do
not, however, seek a remedy traditionally viewed as
-equitable,- such as injunction or restitution.  (The Court
of Appeals held that restitution was unavailable, see 948
F. 2d, at 612, and petitioners have not challenged that.)
Although they often dance around the word, what petition-
ers in fact seek is nothing other than compensatory
damages-monetary relief for all losses their plan sus-
tained as a result of the alleged breach of fiduciary duties.
Money damages are, of course, the classic form of legal
relief.  Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189, 196 (1974);
Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U. S. 558, 570-571 (1990); D.
Dobbs, Remedies 1.1, p. 3 (1973).  And though we have
never interpreted the precise phrase -other appropriate
equitable relief,- we have construed the similar language
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (before its
1991 amendments)-``any other equitable relief as the
court deems appropriate,- 42 U. S. C. 2000e-5(g)-to
preclude -awards for compensatory or punitive damages.-
United States v. Burke, 504 U. S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op.,
at 9).
  Petitioners assert, however, that this reading of -equita-
ble relief- fails to acknowledge ERISA's roots in the
common law of trusts, see Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch, 489 U. S. 101, 110-111 (1989).  -[A]lthough a
beneficiary's action to recover losses resulting from a
breach of duty superficially resembles an action at law for
damages,- the Solicitor General suggests, -such relief
traditionally has been obtained in courts of equity- and
therefore -is, by definition, `equitable relief.'-  Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 13-14.  It is true that,
at common law, the courts of equity had exclusive jurisdic-
tion over virtually all actions by beneficiaries for breach
of trust.  See Lessee of Smith v. McCann, 24 How. 398,
407 (1861); 3 Scott & Fratcher 197, p. 188.  It is also
true that money damages were available in those courts
against the trustee, see United States v. Mitchell, 463
U. S. 206, 226 (1983); G. Bogert & G. Bogert, Law of
Trusts and Trustees 701, p. 198 (rev. 2d ed. 1982)
(hereinafter Bogert & Bogert), and against third persons
who knowingly participated in the trustee's breach, see
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 296-297
(1942); Scott, Participation in a Breach of Trust, 34 Harv.
L. Rev. 454 (1921).
  At common law, however, there were many situa-
tions-not limited to those involving enforcement of a
trust-in which an equity court could -establish purely
legal rights and grant legal remedies which would other-
wise be beyond the scope of its authority.-  1 J. Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence 181, p. 257 (5th ed. 1941).  The
term -equitable relief- can assuredly mean, as petitioners
and the Solicitor General would have it, whatever relief
a court of equity is empowered to provide in the particular
case at issue.  But as indicated by the foregoing quota-
tion-which speaks of -legal remedies- granted by an
equity court--equitable relief- can also refer to those
categories of relief that were typically available in equity
(such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not
compensatory damages).  As memories of the divided
bench, and familiarity with its technical refinements,
recede further into the past, the former meaning becomes,
perhaps, increasingly unlikely; but it remains a question
of interpretation in each case which is intended.
  In the context of the present statute, we think there can
be no doubt.  Since all relief available for breach of trust
could be obtained from a court of equity, limiting the sort
of relief obtainable under 502(a)(3) to -equitable relief-
in the sense of -whatever relief a common-law court of
equity could provide in such a case- would limit the relief
not at all.  We will not read the statute to render the
modifier superfluous.  See United States v. Nordic Village,
Inc., 503 U. S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 6); Moskal v.
United States, 498 U. S. 103, 109-110 (1990).  Regarding
-equitable- relief in 502(a)(3) to mean -all relief available
for breach of trust at common law- would also require us
either to give the term a different meaning there than it
bears elsewhere in ERISA, or to deprive of all meaning
the distinction Congress drew between -equitable- and
-remedial- relief in 409(a), and between -equitable- and
-legal- relief in the very same section of ERISA, see 29
U. S. C. 1132(g)(2)(E); in the same subchapter of ERISA,
see 1024(a)(5)(C); and in the ERISA subchapter dealing
with the PBGC, see 1303(e)(1), 1451(a)(1).  Neither
option is acceptable.  See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos
Drilling Co., 505 U. S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 9); cf.
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 583 (1978).  The authori-
ty of courts to develop a -federal common law- under
ERISA, see Firestone, supra, at 110, is not the authority
to revise the text of the statute.
  Petitioners point to ERISA 502(l), which was added to
the statute in 1989, see Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1989 (OBRA), Pub. L. No. 101-239, 2101, 103
Stat. 2123, and provides as follows:
-(1) In the case of-
     -(A) any breach of fiduciary responsibility under (or
other violation of) part 4 by a fiduciary, or
     -(B) any knowing participation in such a breach or
violation by any other person,
-the Secretary shall assess a civil penalty against
such fiduciary or other person in an amount equal to
20 percent of the applicable recovery amount.-  29
U. S. C. 1132(l)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. III).
The Secretary may waive or reduce this penalty if he
believes that -the fiduciary or other person will [otherwise]
not be able to restore all losses to the plan without severe
financial hardship.-  1132(l)(3)(B).  -Applicable recovery
amount- is defined (in 502(l)(2)(B)) as -any amount . . .
ordered by a court to be paid by such fiduciary or other
person to a plan or its participants or beneficiaries in a
judicial proceeding instituted by the Secretary under
[502](a)(2) or (a)(5).-  It will be recalled that the latter
subsection, 502(a)(5), authorizes relief in actions by the
Secretary on the same terms (-appropriate equitable
relief-) as in the private-party actions authorized by
502(a)(3).  Petitioners argue that 502(l) confirms that
502(a)(5)-and hence, since it uses the same language,
502(a)(3)-allows actions for damages, since otherwise
there could be no -applicable recovery amount- against
some -other person- than the fiduciary, and the Secretary
would have no occasion to worry about whether any such
-other person- would be able to -restore all losses to the
plan- without financial hardship.
  We certainly agree with petitioners that language used
in one portion of a statute (502(a)(3)) should be deemed
to have the same meaning as the same language used
elsewhere in the statute (502(a)(5)).  Indeed, we are even
more zealous advocates of that principle than petitioners,
who stop short of applying it directly to the term -equita-
ble relief.-  We cannot agree, however, that 502(l)
establishes the existence of a damages remedy under
502(a)(5)-i.e., that it is otherwise so inexplicable that
we must give the term -equitable relief- the expansive
meaning -all relief available for breach of trust.-  For
even in its more limited sense, the -equitable relief-
awardable under 502(a)(5) includes restitution of ill-
gotten plan assets or profits, providing an -applicable
recovery amount- to use to calculate the penalty, which
the Secretary may waive or reduce if paying it would
prevent the restoration of those gains to the plan; and
even assuming nonfiduciaries are not liable at all for
knowing participation in a fiduciary's breach of duty, see
supra, at 5-6, cofiduciaries expressly are, see 405(a), so
there are some -other person[s]- than fiduciaries-in-breach
liable under 502(l)(1)(B).  These applications of 502(l)
give it meaning and scope without resort to the strange
interpretation of -equitable relief- in 502(a)(3) that
petitioners propose.  The Secretary's initial interpretation
of 502(l) accords with our view.  The prologue of the
proposed regulation implementing 502(l), to be codified
at 29 CFR 2560.502l-1, states that when a court awards
-equitable relief--as opposed to -monetary damages--a
502(l) penalty will be assessed only if the award involves
the transfer to the plan of money or property.  55 Fed.
Reg. 25288, 25289, and n. 9 (1990).
  In the last analysis, petitioners and the United States
ask us to give a strained interpretation to 502(a)(3) in
order to achieve the -purpose of ERISA to protect plan
participants and beneficiaries.-  Brief for Petitioners 31.
They note, as we have, that before ERISA nonfiduciaries
were generally liable under state trust law for damages
resulting from knowing participation in a trustees's breach
of duty, and they assert that such actions are now pre-
empted by ERISA's broad pre-emption clause, 514(a), 29
U. S. C. 1144(a), see Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,
498 U. S. 133, 139-140 (1990).  Thus, they contend, our
construction of 502(a)(3) leaves beneficiaries like petition-
ers with less protection than existed before ERISA,
contradicting ERISA's basic goal of -promot[ing] the
interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee
benefit plans,- Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85,
90 (1983).  See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U. S., at 114.
  Even assuming (without deciding) that petitioners are
correct about the pre-emption of previously available state-
court actions, vague notions of a statute's -basic purpose-
are nonetheless inadequate to overcome the words of its
text regarding the specific issue under consideration.  See
PBGC v. LTV Corp., 496 U. S. 633, 646-647 (1990).  This
is especially true with legislation such as ERISA, an
enormously complex and detailed statute that resolved
innumerable disputes between powerful competing inter-
ests-not all in favor of potential plaintiffs.  See, e.g.,
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 54-56 (1987).
The text that we have described is certainly not nonsensi-
cal; it allocates liability for plan-related misdeeds in
reasonable proportion to respective actors' power to control
and prevent the misdeeds.  Under traditional trust law,
although a beneficiary could obtain damages from third
persons for knowing participation in a trustee's breach of
fiduciary duties, only the trustee had fiduciary duties, see
1 Scott & Fratcher 2.5, p. 43.  ERISA, however, defines
-fiduciary- not in terms of formal trusteeship, but in
functional terms of control and authority over the plan,
see 29 U. S. C. 1002(21)(A), thus expanding the universe
of persons subject to fiduciary duties-and to dam-
ages-under 409(a).  Professional service providers such
as actuaries become liable for damages when they cross
the line from advisor to fiduciary; must disgorge assets
and profits obtained through participation as parties-in-
interest in transactions prohibited by 406, and pay
related civil penalties, see 502(i), 29 U. S. C. 1132(i);
and (assuming nonfiduciaries can be sued under 502
(a)(3)) may be enjoined from participating in a fiduciary's
breaches, compelled to make restitution, and subjected to
other equitable decrees.  All that ERISA has eliminated,
on these assumptions, is the common law's joint and
several liability, for all direct and consequential damages
suffered by the plan, on the part of persons who had no
real power to control what the plan did.  Exposure to that
sort of liability would impose high insurance costs upon
persons who regularly deal with and offer advice to
ERISA plans, and hence upon ERISA plans themselves.
There is, in other words, a -tension between the primary
[ERISA] goal of benefitting employees and the subsidiary
goal of containing pension costs.-  Alessi v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504, 515 (1981); see also
Russell, 473 U. S., at 148, n. 17.  We will not attempt to
adjust the balance between those competing goals that the
text adopted by Congress has struck.
                  *  *  *
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
                                 Affirmed.